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Abstract
Most prominent models of economic justice (and especially those proposed by Harsanyi
and Rawls) are based on the assumption that impartiality is required for making moral de-
cisions. However, although Harsanyi and Rawls agree on that, and furthermore agree on
the fact that impartiality can be obtained under appropriate conditions of ignorance, they
strongly disagree on the consequences of these assumptions. According to Harsanyi, they
provide a justification for the utilitarian doctrine, whereas Rawls considers that they imply
egalitarianism. We propose here an extension of Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem,
that is based on the representation of ignorance as the set of all possible probability dis-
tributions. We obtain a characterization of the observer’s preferences that, under our most
restrictive conditions, is a linear combination of Harsanyi’s and Rawls’ criteria. Further-
more, this representation is ethically meaningful, in the sense that individuals’ utilities are
cardinally measurable and unit comparable. This allows us to conclude that the impartiality
requirement cannot be used to decide between Rawls’ and Harsanyi’s positions. Finally,
we defend the view that a (strict) combination of Harsanyi’s and Rawls’ criteria provides a
reasonable rule for social decisions.
Keywords: Impartiality, Justice, Decision under ignorance.
JEL Numbers: D63, D81.
1 Introduction
According to a long tradition among moral philosophers, moral judgements have to be made
from the point of view of a rational, impartial and sympathetic observer. This idea is at the core
of two prominent economic models of justice, namely Harsanyi’s (1953; 1977) “utilitarianism”
and Rawls’ (1971) egalitarianism.
The fundamental insight put forward by Harsanyi and Rawls (and, independently, by Vick-
rey (1945)1), is that impartiality can be ensured if the observer is placed under appropriated
∗We thank D. Bouyssou, A. Chateauneuf, M. Cohen, M. Fleurbaey, E. Karni, P. Mongin, J. Moreno-Ternero
and John Weymark, as well as seminar audience at University Pompeu Fabra and University of Cergy-Pontoise for
useful comments. Financial support from an ACI grant by the Ministry of Research is gratefully acknowledged.
†CNRS–CES, gajdos@univ-paris1.fr
‡CERC, f kandil@hotmail.com
1See Mongin (2001) for a thorough comparison of Vickrey’s and Harsanyi’s approaches.
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conditions of ignorance (the “veil of ignorance”, in Rawls (1971)’ terms). In particular, the
observer should “not know in advance what his own social position would be in each social
situation” (Harsanyi, (1977), p. 49).
A strong link is hence established between the theory of morality and the theory of decision
making under ignorance. However, although Rawls and Harsanyi agree on the idea that fair
rules are those chosen by rational individuals from behind the veil of ignorance, they strongly
disagree on what these rules should actually be. Starting from similar assumptions, they end
with opposite conclusions: according to Rawls, the impartiality requirement leads to the egal-
itarian (or maxmin) criterion, whereas according to Harsanyi the same requirement leads to
utilitarianism.
Our aim is to figure out if the impartiality requirement, viewed as ignorance, implies Harsanyi’s
or Rawls’ conclusion. There are two main difficulties here. First, whereas Harsanyi (1977) pro-
posed a formal model of decision from behind the veil of ignorance (his celebrated “Impartial
Observer Model”), Rawls only proposed informal arguments. We therefore need to build a model
that can accommodate Rawls’ views on impartial decisions. The second difficulty is related to
a well-known weakness of Harsanyi’s model: as shown by Sen (1976) and Weymark (1991), the
weights attributed to individuals’ utilities in Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem are not
meaningful, if these utilities are not cardinally comparable. We extend Harsanyi’s model so that
(i) Rawls’ argument can be formalized and (ii) the conclusions we obtain are meaningful, i.e.,
make use of cardinally measurable and unit comparable individual utility functions.
To make our approach clear, let us briefly present Harsanyi’s (1953; 1977) Impartial Observer
Model. Let N be the set of individuals, and X be the set of social alternatives (both finite).
Each individual has a preference relation i on the set Y of lotteries over X (social-alternative
lotteries). Furthermore, these preferences are assumed to obey axioms of expected utility the-
ory. The observer is assumed to be a rational individual, and be able to make judgements such
as: “social-alternative lottery y is better for individual i than social-alternative lottery z for
individual j”. To formalize this idea, Harsanyi (1977) assumes that the observer has preferences
on the set ∆(X × N) of probability distributions over X × N . Elements of ∆(X × N) are
called extended lotteries. The observer’s preferences on extended lotteries are assumed to sat-
isfy axioms of expected utility theory. Harsanyi then adds two axioms. The first one, known as
the acceptance principle, states that whenever the observer has to rank two extended lotteries
in which he is the same individual for sure, he does it the same way as that individual ranks
the corresponding social-alternative lottery. This axiom is intended to capture the observer’s
sympathy towards individuals. The second axiom, which is intended to capture the observer’s
impartiality, states that the observer ranks two social-alternative lotteries as he would rank the
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extended lotteries in which there is an equal chance of being any individual, and all individu-
als face the same social-alternative lottery. In other words, Harsanyi represents ignorance by
equiprobability. As a result, he obtains that the observer’s preferences over social-alternative
lotteries can be represented by the arithmetic mean of some adequately chosen individuals’ von
Neuman-Morgenstern utility functions.
Therefore, Harsanyi’s conclusion is obtained under the assumption according to which igno-
rance can be represented by equiprobability. He justifies this assumption through the so-called
Laplace’s principle. This principle has raised numerous objections, as Mongin (2001) recalls,
and therefore does not provide reasonable grounds for modeling impartiality. Furthermore,
Harsanyi’s theorem presents the following problem, raised by Sen (1976) and Weymark (1991) :
even if one assumes that individuals’ von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities have a cardinal signi-
fication (which is not the case in the standard expected utility theory), the choice of a specific
representation of individuals’ von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities implies that the weights that
appear in the Harsanyi’s theorem are not meaningful. The reason for that is that in Harsanyi’s
model, individuals’ utilities are not cardinally comparable.
Karni (1998) and Mongin (2001) proposed a nice solution to escape both problems: they
assume that the observer obeys the subjective expected utility theory. Therefore, provided
one can identify the observer’s subjective probabilities, the weights would be determined2. An
important feature of these approaches is that they remain inside the Bayesian theory. But,
precisely, Rawls (1971) explicitly rejected such an assumption. Therefore, if we want to take
into account Rawls’ arguments, we need a model that does not assume Bayesianism from the
outset.
Note that Harsanyi and Rawls agree that probabilities should be taken into account, when-
ever they have some objective basis. This suggests that the decision maker’s knowledge can be
represented by a set of probability distributions, that describes all probability distributions that
are possible, according to the decision maker’s factual or logical knowledge. The first step in
our reconstruction of Harsanyi’s impartial observer model is therefore to provide an axiomatic
foundation for the observer’s preferences when his information takes the form of a set of prob-
ability distributions. Several axiomatizations of such preferences have been recently proposed3.
2Karni (1998) obtains this result through a sophisticated construction, that can be interpreted in terms of
impartiality, whereas Mongin (2001) proposes axioms of epistemic nature, related to those introduced by Karni
and Schmeidler (1981).
3The idea of modeling information as a set of probability distributions seems to have first be proposed by
Jaffray (1989), in a model where preferences were defined over belief functions. Wang (2003) and Gajdos, Talon
and Vergnaud (2004b) considered information as a set of probability distributions together with an “anchor”, i.e.,
a probability distribution that has particular salience. Finally, Hayashi (2005) proposed, in an independent work,
a model essentially similar to that of Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud (2004a).
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Among these models, Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud (2004a)’s one is the closest to the one we
provide here. However, this model cannot be used for the observer’s preferences, because it as-
sumes state-independence (as do all models of this kind we are aware of), which would force all
individuals to have the same preferences4. Furthermore, the axiomatization proposed by Gaj-
dos, Tallon and Vergnaud (2004a) (which is stated in Savage’s framework) requires an infinite
state space, which would be difficult to justify in the present framework. Finally, this work was
mainly concerned with a formulation of uncertainty aversion directly related to comparisons of
sets of information, instead of the classical formulation in terms of randomization. However, in
the present context, randomization has a natural interpretation from an ethical point of view,
and we will therefore keep it explicitly in our model.
Viewing complete ignorance as equivalent as considering that all probability distributions
are possible, we are then in position to reconstruct Harsanyi’s impartial observer’s theorem
in an extended framework, that does not assume Bayesianism at the outset. We obtain our
“Ignorant Observer” Theorem which, in his most precise formulation, asserts that the observer’s
preferences on social-alternatives lotteries can be represented by:
V (y) = θmin
i∈N
Vi(y) + (1− θ)
∑
i∈N
1
n
Vi(y)
where θ ∈ [0, 1] is uniquely determined (for a given observer), and the utility functions Vi are
cardinally measurable and unit comparable representations of individuals’ preferences. More
precisely, Vi (i ∈ N) are chosen such that Vi(Y ) = Vj(Y ) for all i, j ∈ N . The above result can
also be written as:
V (y) = θmin
i∈N
Vi(y)−minw∈Y Vi(w)
maxw∈Y Vi(w)−minw∈Y Vi(w) + (1− θ)
∑
i∈N
1
n
Vi(y)−minw∈Y Vi(w)
maxw∈Y Vi(w)−minw∈Y Vi(w)
where again θ ∈ [0, 1] is uniquely determined (for a given observer), but where the Vi are arbitrar-
ily chosen von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions representing individuals’ preferences5.
We therefore conclude that the impartiality requirement is compatible with both Harsanyi’s
and Rawls’ views, for Harsanyi’s criterion is obtained for θ = 0, whereas Rawls’ criterion is
obtained for θ = 1. Considering under which conditions this model specializes into Harsanyi’s
model or Rawls’ one sheds some light on the debate between Rawls and Harsanyi. This leads us
to defend the view that the (strict) combination of Harsanyi’s and Rawls’ criteria (i.e., setting
θ ∈ (0, 1)) leads to a reasonable criterion for social decision.
Organization of the paper
4We are grateful to Edi Karni for having drawn our attention on this point.
5This result seems, at first sight, very similar to the one obtained by Karni (1998). There are, however,
important differences between Karni’s approach and ours. We elaborate on this in Sections 3 and 4.
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The paper is organized as follows. First, we extend Harsanyi’s framework by considering
sets of probability distributions instead of lotteries on individual identities (Section 2). We then
provide an axiomatic characterization of the observer’s preferences in this extended framework
(Section 3). In Section 4, we formalize the impartiality requirement as complete ignorance, in
the sense that all lotteries on individual identities are considered as possible. We then recon-
struct Harsanyi’s impartial observer theorem under these hypothesis, assuming that individuals’
preferences satisfy axioms of expected utility theory, and state our Ignorant Observer Theorems.
Finally, we reconsider, in Section 5, the Harsanyi-Rawls debate in the light of our results, and
defend the view that both solutions are unsatisfactory, whereas a mix of the two (i.e., with
θ ∈ (0, 1)) is a reasonable criterion for social decision.
2 Modeling ignorance
Harsanyi and Rawls agree on the idea that decisions compatible with the principles of social
justice can be thought of as impartial ones. Furthermore, they both consider that impartiality
can be viewed as ignorance concerning the decision maker’s position in society. This idea leads
them to define fair allocation rules as the ones a rational agent, placed under a veil of ignorance,
would choose.
However, Rawls and Harsanyi disagree on the treatment of the information available under
the veil of ignorance. For Harsanyi, uncertainty can be reduced to equiprobability (using the
Bayesian doctrine and Laplace’s principle), whereas Rawls defends the idea that, under com-
plete ignorance, the use of probabilities should be rejected. We propose here a model that can
accommodate both Harsanyi’s and Rawls’ views. We will call Ignorant Observers rational agents
placed under a veil of ignorance. This section is devoted to the description of our formal model
of ignorance.
We consider a society made of a finite number of agents N = {1, · · · , n}. Let X be a
non-empty finite set of social alternatives (or consequences), and Y be the set of probability
distributions over X (social-alternative lotteries). Following Harsanyi (1953) and (1977), indi-
viduals are assumed to have preferences on Y . These preferences are denoted i (i ∈ N). As
customary we denote by ∼i and i the symmetric and asymmetric components of i.
An observer is someone able to make social judgements of the following kind: “social-
alternative lottery y is better for individual i than social-alternative lottery z for individual
j”. In order to make such statement formally, Harsanyi (1977) assumed that the observer has
preferences over the set of all extended lotteries, i.e., lotteries on X × N . We will denote by
E the set of such lotteries. An element of E is thus a function ρ : X × N → [0, 1], such that
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∑
x∈X
∑
i∈N ρ(x, i) = 1, where ρ(x, i) is the probability of being in individual i’s shoes, and
getting x.
Karni and Weymark (1998) proposed the following illuminating interpretation of an extended
lottery. Such a lottery can be viewed as a two stage lottery, where a first lottery on N determines
which individual the observer is to be, and a second lottery on X then determines what the
social state is. Formally, Karni and Weymark (1998) defined a “personal identity lottery” as
a probability distribution p on N , and an “allocation” f as an assignment of a lottery on X
to each individual. Let ∆(N) be the set of all probability distributions on N , and A be the
set of allocations, i.e., the set of all functions from N to Y . Let Ac be the set of constant
allocations, i.e., allocations f such that f(i) = f(j) for all i, j ∈ N . As noted by Mongin and
d’Aspremont (1998) and Karni and Weymark (1998), interpreting individuals as states of the
nature, an allocation is an act in the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) model. The following example
illustrates the correspondance between E and A×∆(N). Assume that N = {1, 2, 3}, X = {a, b},
and consider the following extended lottery:
1 2 3
a 3/8 1/12 1/8
b 1/4 1/12 1/12
p(ρ(i)) 5/8 1/6 5/24
yi(ρ) is then:
1 2 3
a 3/5 1/2 3/5
b 2/5 1/2 2/5
Finally, (f, p) can be represented as follows:
5/8
3/5
a
2/5
b
1/6
1/2
a
1/2
b
5/24
3/5
a
2/5
b
Our formulation of the observer’s preferences will be based on this observation. More for-
mally, an extended lottery ρ can be identified to a couple (f, p) ∈ A × ∆(N) as follows. Let
p(ρ)(i) =
∑
x∈X ρ(x, i), for all i ∈ N , and whenever p(ρ)(i) > 0, let yi(ρ)(x) = ρ(x,i)P
z∈X ρ(z,i)
for
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all x ∈ X, with f(ρ)(i) = yi(ρ). If p(ρ)(i) = 0, let yi(ρ) be an arbitrary element of Y . Finally,
define p(ρ)⊗ f(ρ) by (p(ρ)⊗ f(ρ))(x, i) = p(ρ)(i)yi(ρ)(x). Clearly, ρ = p(ρ)⊗ f(ρ).
Let P be the set of a non-empty, closed sets of probability distributions on N . A generic
element of P will be denoted by P. Furthermore, for all P ∈ P, co(P) denotes the convex hull of
P, and PC denotes the set of all non-empty, closed and convex sets of probability distributions
on N . Finally, δi is the probability distribution on N defined by δi(i) = 1.
The observer’s preferences  will be defined on the product A× P (∼ and  will, as usual,
denote the symmetric and asymmetric component of , respectively). The couple (f,P) can be
interpreted as follows: the observer knows that the probability distribution on N according to
which his identity will be chosen is in the set P, but has no further information on the process
assigning identities. Observe that an extended lottery ρ can be identified to (f(ρ), {p(ρ)}). It is
important to note that a set of probability distribution P ∈ P is here thought of as an objective
data of the decision problem in hand.
This representation of information is compatible both with Harsanyi’s and Rawls’ views
on decision under uncertainty. Indeed, Harsanyi himself insisted that the principle of best
information is one major basis for rational decisions:
(...) in any practical application of the Bayesian approach here is always an implicit
recognition of the principle that the decision maker must choose his subjective prob-
ability in a rational manner, i.e., in the light of the best information available to
him.
Harsanyi, (1977), 3.6, p. 47
A point on which Rawls agrees:
(...) I have simply assumed that judgements of probability, if they are to be grounds
of rational decision, must have an objective basis, that is, a basis in knowledge of
particular facts (or in reasonable beliefs).
Rawls, (1971), Section 28
Harsanyi assumes that the observer is Bayesian and that being completely ignorant about
the probability distribution that governs the individual lottery is equivalent to know for sure that
the individual lottery has a uniform distribution. In other words, Harsanyi makes the following
assumptions: (i) for all f ∈ A, and all P ∈ P, there exists p ∈ P such that (f,P) ∼ (f, {p}),
and (ii) for all f ∈ A, (f,∆(N)) ∼ (f, {µ}), where µ is the uniform distribution on N . The
first assumption is a version of Bayesianism, whereas the second one is what Harsanyi (1977)
calls the“Equal Chance Principle”, and is a mere reformulation of the Laplace principle. These
assumptions seem highly dubious, and are actually related to the decision maker’s attitude
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towards imprecise information, and not to his supposed rationality: they have a psychological
meaning (namely: neutrality towards uncertainty). Note that, in this respect, Rawls’ approach
is not more convincing, since he assumes from the outset that the decision maker has an extreme
aversion towards uncertainty. Our aim is therefore to propose a general decision model on A×P
that lets more open the decision maker’s attitude towards information imprecision.
3 The Observer’s preferences
We now turn to the observer’s preferences on A × P. Our model is similar in spirit to the
one axiomatized by Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud (2004a). However, this last model is state-
independent, which would yield, in our framework, to uniform individuals’ preferences. We
therefore need to relax the sate-independence assumption. Furthermore, the above mentioned
paper aimed at defining an imprecision aversion concept directly related to comparisons of sets
of information. But, as we will show, the classical definition of uncertainty aversion through
preference for randomization can be easily interpreted in the social choice framework. We will
therefore keep such a definition of uncertainty aversion. Finally, Gajdos, Tallon and Vergnaud
(2004a) axiomatization relies on operations on the state space that are difficult to interpret in this
framework, where states are individuals. We will therefore avoid them. Let us note that Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989)’s maxmin model cannot be used here, for two reasons. First, because
it is state-independent, it would lead to uniform individuals’ preferences. Second, this model
does not allow to take into account objective information. Indeed, in Gilboa and Schmeidler’s
(1989) model, objects of choices are acts (i.e., elements of A). There is therefore no way to say,
for instance, that the decision maker prefers the act f together with an information set P over
an act g, together with an information set Q. The (unique) set of probability distributions the
decision maker uses to evaluate acts in Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) model is fixed and of
purely subjective nature: it only depends on the decision maker’s preferences6.
We start by three quite standard Axioms, that require the preference relation  on A × P
to be complete, transitive, non-degenerate and continuous.
Axiom 1 (Ordering).  is a reflexive, complete and transitive binary relation on A× P.
Axiom 2 (Non-degeneracy). For all P ∈ P, there exist f ,g ∈ A such that (f,P)  (g,P).
Axiom 3 (Continuity). For all f , g, h ∈ A, and all P ∈ P, if (f,P)  (g,P)  (h,P), then
there exist α and β in (0, 1) such that :
(αf + (1− α)h,P)  (g,P)  (βf + (1− β)h,P).
6Note that this would also make difficult a state-dependent extension of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s model, since
one would then face the problem of the identification of state-dependent utilities on Y .
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The following notion of mixture of sets of probability distributions will be extensively used
in the sequel.
Notation 1. For all P,Q ∈ P, and all α ∈ [0, 1], the α−mixture of P and Q is defined by:
αP + (1− α)Q = {p ∈ ∆(N)|p = αp1 + (1− α)p2 p1 ∈ P, p2 ∈ Q}.
An element (f, αP+(1−α)Q) of A×P can be interpreted as a compound lottery, in which in
the first stage (P, f) and (Q, f) are obtained with probabilities α and (1−α), respectively. Let
us consider (f,P1), (g,Q1), (f,P2) and (g,Q2) such that the Observer prefers (f,P1) to (g,Q1),
and (f,P2) to (g,Q2). Assume, now, that the observer faces a choice between (f, αP1+(1−α)Q1)
and (g, αQ1+(1−α)Q2). He might reason as follows: with probability α, I would obtain (f,P1)
if I have chosen (f, αP1 + (1− α)Q1), and (g,Q1) if I have chosen (g, αQ1 + (1− α)Q2). Since
I prefer (f,P1) over (g,Q1), it is better for me to choose (f, αP1 + (1 − α)Q1), conditional
on the realization of the event whose probability is α. Similarly, since I prefer (f,Q1) over
(g,Q2), it is better for me to choose (f, αP1 + (1− α)Q1), conditional on the realization of the
event whose probability is (1 − α). Thus, I prefer unconditionally (f, αP1 + (1 − α)Q1) over
(g, αQ1 + (1 − α)Q2). This leads us to the following Axiom, which is a mere extension of the
“Constrained Independence Axiom” proposed by Karni and Safra (2000)7.
Axiom 4 (Set-Mixture Independence). For all P1,Q1,P2,Q2 ∈ P, and for all f, g ∈ A,
(f,P1)  ()(g,Q1)
(f,P2)  (g,Q2)
}
⇒ (f, αP1 + (1− α)P2)  ()(g, αQ1 + (1− α)Q2).
The next axiom concerns comparisons of information sets. It states that if an allocation f
is judged better than another allocation g according to any probability distribution in P, then
(f,P) is judged better than (g,P). Formally:
Axiom 5 (Dominance). For all P ∈ P, if for all p ∈ P, we have (f, {p})  (g, {p}), then
(f,P)  (g,P).
Now, because we do not want to impose state-independence (that would lead in our frame-
work to the conclusion that all individuals’ preferences on Y are identical), we need to construct
allocations that would play the role constant allocations usually play. To do so, we define the
set Acv of constant-valued allocations. These allocations are characterized by the fact that the
observer is indifferent between being individual i or individual j for sure, for all couple (i, j).
Formally,
Acv = {f ∈ A|(f, {δi}) ∼ (f, {δj}), ∀i, j ∈ N}.
7The above interpretation is exactly the one proposed by Karni and Safra (2000), where sets of probability
distributions are considered instead of probability distributions.
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The next axiom is a classical boundedness requirement, with respect to the set of constant-
valued allocations. In particular, this axiom guarantees that Acv is not empty.
Axiom 6 (Boundedness). For all P ∈ P and f ∈ A, there exist f¯ and f in Acv such that:
(f¯ ,P)  (f,P)  (f,P).
A similar axiom can be found, for instance, in Luce and Krantz (1971)’s axiomatization of
state-dependent expected utility. Essentially, it amounts to assume that from the observer’s
point of view, the range of utility over social lotteries, conditionally on being individual i for
sure, is the same as the range of utility over social lotteries, conditionally on being individual j
for sure, for all i, j ∈ N .
The next axiom is the analogous of the C−independence Axiom of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), where the set of constant valued allocations replaces the set of constant allocations. It
states that if (f,P) is judged better than (g,Q), then this relation is preserved if one mixes f
and g with a same constant-valued allocation h.
Axiom 7 (Acv-Independence). For all f, g ∈ A, h ∈ Acv, P,Q ∈ P, and all α ∈ (0, 1),
(f,P)  (g,Q)⇔ (αf + (1− α)h,P)  (αg + (1− α)h,Q).
The next axiom simply states that information on possible probability distributions is irrel-
evant when one compares constant-valued allocations.
Axiom 8 (Information indifference on Acv). For all h ∈ Acv, and all P,Q ∈ P, (h,P) ∼ (h,Q).
We will also assume that only the part of the allocation on which there is a positive probability
for some probability distribution in the information set matters. Formally, let S(P) be the subset
of N defined by S(P) = {i ∈ N |∃p ∈ P s.t. p(i) > 0}. In other words, S(P) is the union of the
supports of all probability distributions in the information set. For any subset E of N , and pair
of allocations (f, g), we define the allocation fEg as (fEg)(i) = f(i) if i ∈ E, and (fEg)(i) = g(i)
is i ∈ N \ E.
Axiom 9 (Equivalence). For all f, g ∈ A, P ∈ P, (f,P) ∼ (fS(P)g,P).
Finally, our last axiom is a version of the uncertainty aversion axiom of Schmeidler (1984),
Chateauneuf (1991) and Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). In the framework of decision under
uncertainty, it simply stipulates that the decision maker exhibits (weak) preference for hedging.
This axiom may also be interpreted from an ethical point of view. We defer this discussion to
Section 4.
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Axiom 10 (Uncertainty aversion). For all f, g ∈ A, P ∈ P, α ∈ (0, 1), (f,P) ∼ (g,P) implies
(αf + (1− α)g,P)  (f,P).
We recall that ˆi is the restriction of  on A × {δi}. We say that a function Vˆi : Y → R
represents ˆi if for all f, g ∈ A:
(f, {δi})  (g, {δi})⇔ Vˆi(f(i)) ≥ Vˆi(g(i)).
We can now state the following Theorem.
Theorem 1. Axioms 1 to 10 hold if, and only if, there exist affine functions Vˆi : Y → R, i ∈ N ,
representing ˆi such that Vˆi(Y ) = Vˆj(Y ), for all i, j ∈ N , and a function F : P→ PC satisfying,
for all P,Q ∈ P:
1. F(P) ⊆ co(P)
2. For all α ∈ [0, 1], F(αP + (1− α)Q) = αF(P) + (1− α)F(Q)
such that for all (f,P), (g,Q) ∈ A× P, (f,P)  (g,Q) if, and only if,
min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) ≥ min
p∈F(Q)
∑
i
Vˆi(g(i)).
Furthermore, F is unique, and {Vˆi}i∈N are unique up to a common positive affine transforma-
tion.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Finally, a more precise representation might be obtained in some cases, if one adds the two
following axioms.
The first one may be interpreted as an anonymity requirement. The idea is that the only
things that matter for the observer, besides the information set, are the utility levels he obtains,
conditionally on being each individual. For any f ∈ A, and any permutation ϕ : N → N ,
define A(fϕ) = {g ∈ A ∣∣(g, {δi}) ∼ (f, {δϕ−1(i)}), ∀i ∈ n}. Hence, for all g ∈ A(fϕ), individual
i gets the same utility level as individual ϕ−1(i) under allocation f . Now, let Pϕ be defined
by Pϕ = {pϕ|p ∈ P}, where for all p ∈ P, pϕ(i) = p(ϕ−1(i)) for all i ∈ N . Essentially, (f,P)
and (g,Pϕ) (with ϕ a permutation and g ∈ A(fϕ)) only differ by the names of the states. The
following axiom states that the observer is indifferent between them.
Axiom 11 (Anonymity). For all (f,P) ∈ A × P and all permutation ϕ : N → N , and all
g ∈ A(fϕ), (f,P) ∼ (g,Pϕ).
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The next axiom states that whenever two allocations share the same worst probability distri-
bution in P, a mixture of these allocations will not reduce the degree of uncertainty, and therefore
will not lead to an improvement, whenever P is the available information set. Recall that in
Axiom 10, we interpreted preference for hedging (or mixture) as uncertainty aversion. With this
in mind, indifference for hedging would be interpreted as neutrality towards uncertainty. The
following axiom can therefore be viewed as a restricted neutrality towards uncertainty8.
Axiom 12 (Restricted Mixture Neutrality). For all P ∈ P, and all f, g ∈ A, if there exists
p∗ ∈ P such that (f, {p})  (f, {p∗}) and (g, {p})  (g, {p∗}) for all p ∈ P, then for all
α ∈ [0, 1],
(f,P) ∼ (g,P)⇔ (αf + (1− α)g,P) ∼ (g,P).
Before stating our next result, we need some additional piece of notation. For any S ⊆ N ,
let ∆(S) be the set of all probability distributions with support in S. Let:
B = {P ∈ P|∃(αt)t=1,...,r ∈ [0, 1] and (St)t=1,...,r ∈ N s.t.
∑
t
αt = 1,P =
∑
t
αt∆(St)}.
Hence, an element of B is a linear combination of simplices with supports in N . Furthermore,
for P = ∑t αt∆(St), let c(P) = ∑t αtc(∆(St)), where c(∆(St)) is the probability distribution
defined by c(∆(St))(s) = 1|St| (hence, c(∆(St)) is the uniform distribution on St).
We then obtain the following representation when the information belongs to B9.
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1, Axioms 11 and 12 hold if, and only if, there
exist affine functions Vˆi : Y → R, i ∈ N , representing ˆi such that Vˆi(Y ) = Vˆj(Y ), for all
i, j ∈ N , and θ ∈ [0, 1] such that for all P,Q ∈ B, and all f, g ∈ A, (f,P)  (g,Q) if, and only
if:
θmin
p∈P
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i))+(1−θ)
∑
i
c(P)(i)Vˆi(f(i)) ≥ θmin
p∈Q
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(g(i))+(1−θ)
∑
i
c(Q)(i)Vˆi(g(i)).
Furthermore, θ is unique, and {Vˆi}i∈N are unique up to a common positive affine transformation.
Proof. See the appendix.
8Mixture neutrality can be considered as the analogue of the betweeness property for preferences under risk (on
the betweeness property, see e.g., Chew (1983; 1989) and Dekel (1986)). Attitude towards mixture is considered
in details in Klibanoff (2001).
9The set B is known in decision theory as the set of cores of beliefs. Actually, the following representation
theorem, which is only given when the information takes the form of a core of a belief, can be extended to convex
combinations of symmetric polytopes. However, for the problem under consideration, such an extension would
not be a great improvement.
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4 The Ignorant Observer Theorem
We now define individuals’ preferences i on Y . As Harsanyi does, we assume that individuals
obey von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axiom. It should be noted that this assumption is by
no means in conflict with Rawls’ views. Indeed, Rawls only rejected the use of the Bayesian
doctrine from behind the veil of ignorance. Formally, these axioms are as follows.
Axiom 13 (Ordering). i is a reflexive, complete and transitive binary relation on Y .
Axiom 14 (Continuity). For all w, y, z ∈ Y such that w i y i z, there exists and α ∈ (0, 1)
such that αw + (1− α)z ∼i y.
Axiom 15 (Independence). For all w, y, z ∈ Y and all α ∈ [0, 1], y i z implies αy+(1−α)w i
αz + (1− α)w.
As well known (see e.g. Fishburn (1970)) a preference relation satisfies these three axioms
if, and only if, it can be represented by an Expected Utility functional. This is stated formally
in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Axiom 13 to 15 hold if, and only if, there exists a linear real-valued function Ui
on Y such that for all y, z ∈ Y , y i z if, and only if, Ui(y) ≥ Ui(z). Furthermore, such a
representation is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Our aim is to deduce, from individuals’ preferences i on Y and the Observer’s preferences
 on A × P, a “social preference” ∗ on Y . In order to do so, one needs to specify how these
preferences interact.
Individuals’ preferences and the observer’s ones are linked by the so-called “acceptance prin-
ciple” (see Harsanyi (1977)) which states that if the observer is sure to be i, her choices should
be the same as those of i. Let δi be the probability distribution on N defined by δi(i) = 1. The
acceptance axiom can be restated as follows in our framework.
Axiom 16 (Acceptance). For all i ∈ N , and all f, g ∈ A, (f, {δi})  (g, {δi}) if and only if
f(i) i g(i).
We now turn to the link between social preferences and the observer’s ones. The fundamental
idea of the veil of ignorance is that (fair) social preferences are those of an observer who is totally
ignorant about the position he will eventually get in the society. There are two issues here. First,
social preferences are defined over social alternatives in Y , whereas the observer’s preferences
are defined on the product A×P of allocations and information sets. For all y ∈ Y , let ky ∈ A be
the allocation defined by ky(i) = y for all i ∈ N . It is natural to define the observer’s preferences
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Y on Y × P as follows: (y,P) Y (z,Q) iff (ky,P)  (kz,Q). Now, we should formalize the
idea that the observer is totally ignorant about his position. In our framework, this is captured
by the fact that the information set is ∆(N), the set of all probability distributions over the set
N of individuals. This leads us to the following axiom.
Axiom 17 (Ignorance). For all y, z ∈ Y , y ∗ z if, and only if, (ky,∆(N))  (kz,∆(N)).
We can now state a first representation Theorem.
Theorem 4. Assume that the observer’s preferences satisfy all axioms of Theorem 1, and in-
dividuals’ preferences satisfy all the axioms of Theorem 3. Then Axioms 16 and 17 hold if,
and only if, there exist affine functions Vi : Y → R, i ∈ N , representing i, and a function
F : P→ PC satisfying, for all P,Q ∈ P:
1. F(P) ⊆ co(P)
2. For all α ∈ [0, 1], F(αP + (1− α)Q) = αF(P) + (1− α)F(Q)
such that for all y, z ∈ Y , y ∗ z if, and only if,
min
p∈F(∆(N))
∑
i
p(i)
Vi(y)−minw∈Y Vi(w)
maxw∈Y Vi(w)−minw∈Y Vi(w) ≥ minp∈F(∆(N))
∑
i
p(i)
Vi(z)−minw∈Y Vi(w)
maxw∈Y Vi(w)−minw∈Y Vi(w) .
Furthermore, F is unique.
Proof. This is a straightforward corollary of Theorem 1. Axiom 16 implies i= ˆi. Let Vi be an
affine representation of i. By Theorem 3, Vi is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Therefore, V ∗i (y) =
Vi(y)−minw∈Y Vi(w)
maxw∈Y Vi(w)−minw∈Y Vi(w) is also an affine representation of i. Furthermore,
V ∗i (Y ) = V
∗
j (Y ) for all i, j ∈ N . Define V˜i(f) = V ∗i (f(i)) for all f ∈ A. Clearly, V˜i are affine
representations of ˆi and satisfy V˜i(Y ) = V˜j(Y ) for all i, j ∈ N . The result then follows from
Theorem 1.
It should be noted that, although the impartial observer only compares allocations under
complete ignorance, the above theorem rests on a primitive ordering on the entire set A×P. In
other words, the domain of the observer’s preference is in some sense too large. This is certainly
a drawback, which is common to Harsanyi’s Theorem and ours (Harsanyi’s observer’s preferences
are defined over all extended lotteries, although only constant impartial lotteries are eventually
considered by the impartial observer). Karni and Weymark (1998) pointed out this difficulty,
and solved it for Harsanyi’s Theorem, providing an informationally parsimonious version of
Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem. It is an open question whether a similar improvement
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could be made in our case. However, we did not feel that this question was essential, and left it
aside.
Observe that the exact form of F(∆(N)) will actually depend on the decision maker uncer-
tainty aversion. A more precise form may be obtained if we use Axioms 11 and 12. Indeed,
Theorem 2 leads to the following result.
Theorem 5. Assume that the observer’s preferences satisfy all axioms of Theorem 2, and in-
dividuals’ preferences satisfy all the axioms of Theorem 3. Then Axioms 16 and 17 hold if, and
only if, there exist affine functions Vi : Y → R, i ∈ N , representing i, and a real number
θ ∈ [0, 1], such that for y, z ∈ Y , y ∗ z if, and only if:
θmin
i∈N
Vi(y)−minw∈Y Vi(w)
maxw∈Y Vi(w)−minw∈Y Vi(w) + (1− θ)
∑
i∈N
1
n
Vi(y)−minw∈Y Vi(w)
maxw∈Y Vi(w)−minw∈Y Vi(w)
≥ θmin
i∈N
Vi(z)−minw∈Y Vi(w)
maxw∈Y Vi(w)−minw∈Y Vi(w) + (1− θ)
∑
i∈N
1
n
Vi(z)−minw∈Y Vi(w)
maxw∈Y Vi(w)−minw∈Y Vi(w) .
Furthermore, θ is unique.
Proof. Similar to that of Theorem 4.
Such a criterion can be easily interpreted: it consists in a weighted average between Harsanyi’s
utilitarian criterion, and Rawls’ maxmin criterion. It should be noted that this specific func-
tional form comes from Axioms 11 and 12. Axiom 11 plays a transparent role: it ensures that
the symmetry of the set of probability distributions that represents the available information
will be preserved in the decision rule. Axiom 12 forces the set of probability distributions used
in the decision rule to have a similar shape as the set of probability distributions that represents
the available information.
Let us note that, in both Theorem 4 and 5, individuals’ utility functions Vi(y)−minw∈Y Vi(w)maxw∈Y Vi(w)−minw∈Y Vi(w)
are cardinally measurable and unit comparable. Therefore, the weights assigned to these func-
tions cannot be manipulated, and are meaningful. As mentioned above, the normalization
of individuals’ utility functions we obtained is very similar to that obtained by Karni (1998),
Dhillon and Mertens (1999), Segal (2000) and Moreno-Ternero and Roemer (2005)10 : In all
these works, the weight of each individual depends on the diameter of the range of her utility
function11. Since Karni (1998) is the paper to which we are the closest, let us insist on a signif-
icant difference between Karni’s approach and the one we followed here. First, Karni assumes
that the observer’s preferences are defined on extended lotteries, in Harsanyi’s sense12. This
10Although in a very restrictive case (i.e., when individuals’ preferences are risk-isomorphic).
11See also Karni (2003) for a related approach.
12Although he uses Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) formalism.
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implies that he faces the well-known problem of the determination of the weights the observer
attaches to each individual. This is where his “Impartiality Axiom”, plays a key role. Our
approach is rather different: since the weights that appear in our representation theorem are
based on objective information (i.e., since probability distributions on individual lotteries are
part of the model), we do not face the problem of their determination. Hence, the normalization
of individuals’ utilities can be seen as coming from a strictly epistemic axiom (namely, Axiom
6), which should not be interpreted in terms of impartiality: our impartiality requirement lies
actually in the nature of the information the observer can use to make her decisions.
5 The justification problem
5.1 Under what conditions is the observer utilitarian or rawlsian?
According to our Ignorant Observer theorem, there is not one but a plurality of decision rules
complying with the impartiality requirement (as formalized by the veil of ignorance). These
include both Harsanyi’s utilitarian criterion and Rawls’ maximin principle.
For instance, assuming that ignorant observer is an expected utility maximizer, one would
obviously obtain the utilitarian rule. This requirement would take, in our framework, the fol-
lowing form, which is a strengthening of Axiom 10:
Axiom 18 (Neutrality towards uncertainty). For all f, g ∈ A and all P ∈ P, (f,P) ∼ (g,P)
implies, for all α ∈ (0, 1), (αf + (1− α)g,P) ∼ (f,P).
On the other hand, the ignorant observer would be rawlsian if, and only if, she obeys the
following axiom.
Axiom 19 (Extreme aversion towards uncertainty). For all f ∈ A, P ∈ P and p ∈ P, (f, {p}) 
(f,P).
How can such axioms be justified? We have two possibilities. We may use a decision theoretic
semantics, interpreting these axioms from an epistemic point of view. But we may also use a
social choice semantics, interpreting these axioms from an ethical point of view. In the next two
subsections, we investigate these interpretations. This investigation aims at clearly identifying
the ethical and epistemic foundations of the veil of ignorance. It can be seen as a continuation
of Mongin’s (2001) attempt to clarify the foundations of Harsanyi’s approach.
5.2 An epistemic view on Rawls-Harsanyi’s debate
The model shows that the rational choice of the ignorant observer depends on her attitude
towards uncertainty. If she is neutral to uncertainty she will use the expected utility criterion,
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whereas if she is extremely averse to uncertainty, she will use the maximin criterion. But, from
an epistemic point of view, it is reasonable to suppose that she is none of the two. Hence, it
seems difficult to defend Axioms 18 and 19 on an epistemic basis.
Consider first Axiom 18. In a decision theoretic semantics, this axiom can be interpreted
as neutrality towards uncertainty. As shown by Ellsberg (1961), such a neutrality towards
uncertainty is very unlikely. Consider an individual facing an urn, containing 100 balls, either
black or white, in unknown proportion. The decision maker has the choice between betting on
black (then receiving 100e if the drawn ball is black, and 0e if it is white), and betting on white
(then receiving 100e if the drawn ball is white, and 0e if it is black). Much likely, the decision
maker would be indifferent between these two bets. Now, one proposes to this decision maker
the following bet: win 50e whatever the color of the drawn ball will be. Most of the decision
makers would prefer such a bet to any of the two first ones. Hence, there are good reasons to
dismiss this axiom from a decision theoretic point of view.
Is Axiom 19 more appealing? This axiom requires in particular the observer to prefer
(weakly) any lottery on the set of individuals to complete ignorance. In particular, she must
prefer (weakly) to be the worst-off individuals for sure, rather than facing complete ignorance
concerning her identity. Such a requirement seems very unlikely from a decision theoretic point
of view.
Actually, Rawls added two epistemic arguments for the maximin criterion. The first one
relates to the “very considerable normal risk-aversion (given the special features of the original
position)” (Rawls (1974a), p.144). He pointed out “the crucial nature of the decision in the
original position” (id., p.143). It is a solemn choice which consequences are decisive not only
for the decision maker, but also for her family and her descendants. For, she has to choose
which type of society they will leave in now and forever. This argument implies that the
importance of the decision under consideration should be taken into account. But this raises
new difficulties, for it is clear that the degree of importance of a decision is something essentially
subjective. All in all, this is a completely different model, that is far away from existing models
of decision making under uncertainty. And the main insight of the veil of ignorance – namely,
that assuming ignorance is enough to know what a fair decision should be, without any other
assumptions specific to the fact that the problem under consideration is a social choice problem
– would be lost.
The second epistemic argument Rawls raised in favor of the maximin relates to the“contractual”
meaning of the Original Position. The partners are to favor the principles that any of them would
agree with (in Rawls’ terminology, there should be a public and unanimous agreement). This
entails, says Rawls, that any of the partners has a veto. Taking into account this veto, the
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rational solution is to be prudent, and therefore to use the maximin criterion, for “the maximin
criterion assures the less favored that inequalities work to their advantage” (id.). Actually, some
authors, (see, e.g., Binmore ((1989)) did propose a model of collective bargaining or a voting
model including a veto procedure from behind the veil of ignorance. But, at best, this argument
leads to conclude that contracting from behind the veil of ignorance leads to a maxmin allocation
rule. It cannot be used to prove that an impartial observer should apply the maxmin criterion.
We shall therefore conclude that the Rawls-Harsanyi debate cannot be resolved in favor of
any of the protagonists on an epistemic basis. It is therefore necessary to contemplate an ethical
interpretation of Axioms 18 and 19. Actually we shall show, in the next subsection, that it is
even more difficult to provide an ethical justification either for Axiom 18 or for Axiom 19.
5.3 An ethical view on Rawls-Harsanyi’s debate
Axiom 18 is relatively easy to interpret from an ethical point of view, since it is directly related
to a kind of neutrality towards inequalities. To grasp the intuition behind the axiom, let us
consider the following simple example.
Assume that the society is composed of two individuals, 1 and 2, and let P = ∆({1, 2}),
∆({1, 2}) is the set of all probability distributions on {1, 2}. Let f and g be two allocations,
whose incomes (in terms of utilities, represented by a function representing i) are as follows:
1 2
f 1 0
g 0 1
h 12
1
2
Assume that the ignorant observer is indifferent between (f,∆({1, 2})) and (g,∆({1, 2})) (this
would be the case, in particular, if Axiom 11 holds). Observe that f and g are highly unequal.
Now, consider h, which is simply defined as 12f +
1
2g. Obviously, h is less unequal than f and
g. It makes sense, therefore, to assume that the ignorant observer will prefer h to f and g.
However, Axiom 18 forces the observer to be indifferent between f and g. Actually, this is the
main point made by Diamond (1967)’s famous objection to Harsanyi. Such an argument can
also be found, e.g., in Epstein and Segal (1992).
We now turn to Axiom 19. This axiom says that the Ignorant Observer gives consideration
only to the worst consequences. This assumption is inconsistent with Rawls’ own interpretation
of the Original Position. According to him (Rawls, (1974a; 1975), the decision maker placed
under the veil of ignorance should consider all members of the society as free and equal moral
persons. Then, her decision should comply with two requirements dealing with the society
members’ opportunities. First, “those able to gain from their good fortune do so in ways
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agreeable to those less favoured”. (Rawls, (1974a), p.145). Secondly, “natural variations (in
talents) are recognised as an opportunity, particularly since they are often complementary and
form a basis for social ties” (ibid.). The first requirement imposes a Pareto-optimality condition.
The second requirement imposes a condition of “fair opportunity” for each member of the society
(ibid.). It is obvious that such conditions contradict with Axiom 19.
5.4 Arguments for a compromise
Thus, none of the axioms 18 or 19 are ethically appealing. We would like, here, to give some
arguments in favor of the compromise suggested by Theorem 5. Once one is convinced that both
Rawls’ and Harsanyi’s criteria are unappealing, adoption of the Axioms of Theorem 5 would
indeed lead to a strict compromise between Rawls’ egalitarianism and Harsanyi’s utilitarianism.
The two key axioms that allow to obtain Theorem 5 are Axioms 11 and 12. The first one
is a standard anonymity assumption, that simply states that individuals’ names are irrelevant
when one compares two allocations. Axiom 12 is less usual, and can actually be viewed as a
restriction of Axioms 18, that escapes Diamond’s critique. Indeed, consider again Diamond’s
example presented in section 5.3. It is clearly not the case that f and g share the same worst
probability distribution in ∆({1, 2}), since the worst case if f is chosen is to be individual 2 for
sure, whereas the worst case if g is chosen is to be individual 1 for sure. Therefore, one can
not conclude that h ∼ f . Now, consider the following variation of Diamond’s example, with 3
individuals.
1 2 3
f 1 0 0
g 1 1 0
h 1 12 0
Assume, now, that the observer is indifferent between (f,∆({1, 2, 3})) and (g,∆({1, 2, 3})). Since
δ3 is the worst probability distribution for both f and g, Axiom 12 leads to the conclusion that
(h,∆({1, 2, 3})) ∼ (f,∆({1, 2, 3})) ∼ (g,∆({1, 2, 3})). Is this reasonable? Yes, insofar as the
observer’s indifference between (f,∆({1, 2, 3})) and (g,∆({1, 2, 3})) indicates that he cares a lot
about the worst-off individual, and this individual is the same whatever the allocation chosen
(namely, 3), and has always the same utility.
This leads us to believe that the allocation rule proposed in Theorem 5 (with θ ∈ (0, 1))
is a reasonable one. Of course, this rule is in sharp conflict with Harsanyi’s view, since it is
not compatible with utilitarianism, as soon as θ > 0. On the other hand, it is not sure that
Rawls would have been unpleased with it. Although after A Theory of Justice was published,
he wrote some articles to defend the maximin (see e.g., Rawls (1974a), (1974b)), his arguments
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were often conflicting, and even contradicting, as we have seen, his own interpretation of the
veil of ignorance. We take these contradictions as an evidence that his main purpose was not
to defend a specific criterion of rational decision under ignorance. Since his project was first to
propose a theory of social justice alternative to Utilitarianism, his main purpose with the veil
of ignorance model was to acknowledge a solution excluding Utilitarianism. As himself wrote:
“But I do not wish to overemphasize this criterion: a deeper investigation (...) may
show that some other conception of justice is more reasonable.”
Rawls, (1974a), p.145
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
The necessity part of the Theorem is easily checked. We therefore only prove the sufficiency
part. The proof goes through several claims. Although not explicitly stated in the claims, all
the assumptions of Theorem 1 are made throughout this subsection.
Claim 1. Acv is convex.
Proof. Let f, g ∈ Acv, and α ∈ [0, 1]. By definition of Acv, (f, {δi}) ∼ (f, {δj}) for all i, j ∈ N .
Therefore, by Axiom 7, (αf + (1 − α)g, {δi}) ∼ (αf + (1 − α)g, {δj}) for all i, j ∈ N . Hence,
αf + (1− α)g ∈ Acv, which proves that Acv is convex.
Claim 2. For all i ∈ N , all f, g, h ∈ A, and all α ∈ (0, 1),
(f, {δi})  (g, {δi})⇔ (αf + (1− α)h, {δi})  (αg + (1− α)h, {δi}).
Proof. Let f, g, h ∈ A. By Axiom 6, there exist h¯, h ∈ Acv such that (h¯, {δi})  (h, {δi}) 
(h, {δi}). Hence, by Axioms 1 and 3, there exists θ ∈ [0, 1] such that (h, {δi}) ∼ (θh¯ + (1 −
θ)h, {δi}). Let hˆ = θh¯+ (1− θ)h. By Claim 1, hˆ ∈ Acv. Next, let h˜ be defined by h˜(i) = h(i),
and h˜(j) = hˆ(j) for all j 6= i. We then have, by Axiom 9, (h˜, {δi}) ∼ (h, {δi}) ∼ (hˆ, {δi}).
Furthermore, for all j 6= i, (h˜, {δj}) ∼ (h˜, {δi}) by construction. Therefore, h˜ ∈ Acv. By Axiom
7, for all α ∈ (0, 1),
(f, {δi})  (g, {δi})⇔ (αf + (1− α)h˜, {δi})  (αg + (1− α)h˜, {δi}).
But, by Axiom 9, (αf + (1 − α)h˜, {δi}) ∼ (f + (1 − α)h, {δi}), and (αg + (1 − α)h˜, {δi}) ∼
(g + (1− α)h, {δi}). Therefore,
(f, {δi})  (g, {δi})⇔ (αf + (1− α)h, {δi})  (αg + (1− α)h, {δi}),
the desired result.
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Claim 3. For all i, there exits an affine function Vˆi : Y → R such that for all f, g ∈ A,
(f, {δi})  (g, {δi})⇔ Vˆi(f(i)) ≥ Vˆi(g(i)).
Furthermore, Vˆi is unique up to a positive affine transformation.
Proof. Let i be fixed in N , and ˆi be the restriction of  to A × {δi}. By Axioms 1, 3
and Claim 2, ˆi satisfies von Neumann-Morgenstern Axioms. Therefore there exists an affine
function U : A → R, unique up to a positive affine transformation, such that for all f, g ∈ A,
(f, {δi})  (g, {δi})⇔ Ui(f) ≥ Ui(g).
By Axiom 9, for all f, f ′ ∈ A such that f(i) = f ′(i), (f, {δi}) ∼ (f ′, {δi}). Therefore, defining
Vˆi : Y → R by Vˆi(f(i)) = Ui(f ′) for all f ′ ∈ A such that f ′(i) = f(i), one obtains the desired
result.
In the sequel, we will make the following slight abuse of notation: we will denote by Vˆi
both the function Vˆi : Y → R defined in Claim 3 and the function V˜i : A → R defined by
V˜i(f) = Vˆi(f(i)).
Claim 4. For all P ∈ P, f, g ∈ A,{
(f, {δi})  (g, {δi}), ∀i ∈ N ⇒ (f,P)  (g,P)
(f, {δi})  (g, {δi}), ∀i ∈ N ⇒ (f,P)  (g,P).
Proof. Let f, g ∈ A be such that (f, {δi})  (g, {δi}) for all i ∈ N . By Axiom 4, for all
(α1, · · · , αn) such that αi ≥ 0 for all i, and
∑
i∈N αi = 1, we have (f,
∑
i∈N αi{δi})  (g,
∑
i∈N αi{δi}).
Therefore, for all p ∈ ∆(N), (f, {p})  (g, {p}). Hence, by Axiom 5, for all P ∈ P, (f,P) 
(g,P). The second part of the Claim is proved using the same argument.
Claim 5. There exist f and g in Acv such that for all i ∈ N , (f, {δi})  (g, {δi}).
Proof. Let P ∈ P be fixed. By Axiom 2, there exists fˆ , gˆ ∈ A such that (fˆ ,P)  (gˆ,P). By
Axiom 6, there exist f, g ∈ Acv such that (f,P)  (fˆ ,P) and (gˆ,P)  (g,P). Therefore,
(f,P)  (g,P). Since f and g belong to Acv, Axiom 8 implies that (f, {δi})  (g, {δi}) for all
i ∈ N .
Claim 6. For all P ∈ P, there exists an Acv−affine functional VP : A → R such that for all
f, g ∈ A:
(f,P)  (g,P)⇔ VP(f) ≥ VP(g).
Furthermore, VP is unique up to a positive affine transformation, and VP(A) = VP(Acv).
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Proof. This result follows from Claim 1, Axioms 1, 3, 6, 7 and Corollary 2 in Castagnoli,
Marinacci and Maccherroni (2003).
For all h ∈ A \ Acv, let Ah = co{h,Acv}.
Claim 7. There exist affine representations Vˆi (i ∈ N) of  on A × {δi}, satisfying Vˆi(A) =
Vˆj(A), for all i, j ∈ N , such that, for all P ∈ P, h ∈ A \ Acv, there exits an Acv−affine
representation VP of  on A × {P} and non-negative numbers λ1(h,P), · · · , λn(h,P), not all
equal to zero, and summing up to one, such that, for all f ∈ Ah,
VP(f) =
∑
i∈N
λi(h,P)Vˆi(f).
Moreover, {Vˆi}i∈N are unique up to a common positive affine transformation.
Proof. For all i, let f∗i be such that f
∗
i ˆif for all f ∈ A, and f∗i be such that fˆif∗i for all
f ∈ A. These allocations are well defined, since A is a compact set. Define f∗ and f∗ by
f∗(i) = f∗i (i) and f∗(i) = f∗i(i) for all i ∈ N .
By Axiom 9, f∗∼ˆif∗i , and f∗∼ˆif∗i for all i ∈ N . Therefore, by Claim 4, f∗ˆifˆif∗ for all
f ∈ A and all i ∈ N . Let Vˆi (i ∈ N) be affine representations of ˆi, as defined in Claim 3, and
VP be an Acv−affine representation of  on A × {P}, as defined in Claim 6. Without loss of
generality, since the Vˆi and VP are defined up to a positive affine transformation, we can choose
Vˆi such that Vˆi(f∗) = VP(f∗) = 1 and Vˆi(f∗) = VP(f∗) = −1 for all i ∈ N . We thus have
Vˆi(A) = [−1, 1] for all i ∈ N .
We now show that for all f ∈ Acv, and all i, j ∈ N , Vˆi(f) = Vˆj(f). Let f ∈ Acv. Three cases
are possible.
Case 1. f∗ˆifˆif∗, for all i ∈ N .
By Axioms 1 and 3, for all P ∈ P, there exists αP such that (f,P) ∼ (αPf∗+(1−αP)f∗,P).
By Claim 1, αPf∗ + (1 − αP)f∗ ∈ Acv. Therefore, by Axiom 8, αPf∗ + (1 − αP)f∗∼ˆif for all
i ∈ N . Hence, for all i ∈ N , Vˆi(f) = αP Vˆi(f∗) + (1 − αP)Vˆi(f∗) = 2αP − 1, which proves that
Vˆi(f) = Vˆj(f) for all i, j ∈ N .
Case 2. fˆif∗, for all i ∈ N .
Again, by Axioms 1 and 3, for all P ∈ P, there exists αP such that (f∗,P) ∼ (αPf + (1 −
αP)f∗,P). By Claim 1, αPf +(1−αP)f∗ ∈ Acv. Therefore, by Axiom 8, αPf +(1−αP)f∗∼ˆif∗
for all i ∈ N . Hence, for all i ∈ N , Vˆi(f∗) = αP Vˆi(f)+(1−αP)Vˆi(f∗). Therefore, Vˆi(f) = 2−αPαP ,
which proves that Vˆi(f) = Vˆj(f) for all i, j ∈ N .
Case 3. f∗ˆif , for all i ∈ N .
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This case is hold as Case 2 above.
We thus have Vˆi(f) = Vˆj(f), for all i, j ∈ N and f ∈ Acv.
Assume now that {V˜i}i∈N is another set of affine functions representing {ˆi}i∈N and sat-
isfying V˜i(A) = V˜j(A) for all i, j ∈ N . This implies that V˜i(f∗) = V˜j(f∗) and V˜i(f∗) = V˜j(f∗)
for all i, j ∈ N . Therefore, by the same argument as above, we must have V˜i(f) = V˜j(f) for
all i, j ∈ N , and all f ∈ Acv. Because V˜i are unique up to an affine transformation, there must
exist a1, · · · , an > 0 and b1, · · · , bn ∈ R such that for all i, V˜i = aiVˆi+ bi. But as we have shown,
one must also have: V˜i(f) = V˜j(f) for all f ∈ Acv. Hence, aiVˆi(f) + bi = aj Vˆj(f) + bj for all
i, j ∈ N , f ∈ Acv. Since Vˆi(f) = Vˆj(f) for all f ∈ Acv and all i, j ∈ N , and Vˆi is not constant
on Acv, this implies ai = aj and bi = bj .
Let F : A → Rn+1 be defined by F (f) = (VP(f), Vˆ1(f), · · · , Vˆn(f)). Let K = F (Ah). By
Claims 1, 3 and 6, K is convex. Therefore, by Claims 4 and 5, we can apply proposition 2 in
De Meyer and Mongin (1995) : there exist non-negative numbers λ1(h,P), · · · , λn(h,P), and a
real number µ(h,P) such that for all f ∈ Ah,
VP(f) =
∑
i∈N
λi(h,P)Vˆi(f) + µ(h,P).
We hence have: {
VP(f∗) = 1 =
∑
i∈N λi(h,P) + µ(h,P)
VP(f∗) = −1 = −
∑
i∈N λi(h,P) + µ(h,P).
Therefore,
∑
i λi(h,P) + µ(h,P) =
∑
i∈N λi(h,P) − µ(h,P), which implies µ(h,P) = 0, and
therefore,
∑
i∈N λi(h,P) = 1.
Claim 8. For all P ∈ P, there exists a unique compact and convex set F(P) ∈ P such that, for
all f, g ∈ A,
(f,P)  (g,P)⇔ min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) ≥ min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)),
where the Vˆi are affine representations of ˆi such that Vˆi(A) = Vˆj(A) for all i, j ∈ N . Moreover,
{Vˆi}i∈N are unique up to a common positive affine transformation.
Proof. Let P ∈ P be fixed, and VP , Vˆi (i ∈ N) be defined as in Claim 7.
Let B˜ = {(Vˆ1(f), · · · , Vˆn(f))|f ∈ A}, and B(N,VP(A)) be the set of functions from N to
VP(A). One has obviously B˜ ⊆ B(N,VP(A)). We show now that B(N,VP) ⊆ B˜ is also true.
Let ϕ : N → VP(A). By Claim 6, VP(A) = VP(Acv). Therefore, for all i ∈ N , there exists
hi ∈ Acv such that ϕ(i) = VP(hi). Let f ∈ A be defined by f(i) = hi(i) for all i ∈ N . We then
have Vˆi(f) = Vˆi(hi) and, since hi ∈ Acv, Vˆi(hi) = VP(hi). Therefore, (Vˆ1(f), · · · , Vˆn(f)) = ϕ.
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Let I : B(N,VP(A))→ R be defined by:
I(ϕ) = VP(f), if ϕ = (Vˆ1(f), · · · , Vˆn(f)).
By Claim 4, I is monotone, and by Claim 7, I(0) = 0 and I(1) = 1. and I is VP(Acv)-
affine. Furthermore, Axiom 10 implies that I is concave. Therefore, its positive homogeneous
extension J to B(N), the set of all functions from N to R is monotone, superlinear, and such that
J(ϕ+ k) = J(ϕ) + k for all k ∈ R. Therefore, by a classical result (see, e.g., the “Fundamental
Lemma” in Chateauneuf (1991), and Lemma 3.5 in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)), there exists
a unique compact convex set F(P) ∈ P such that:
J(ϕ) = min
p∈F(P)
∑
i∈N
p(i)ϕ(i).
Therefore, for all f ∈ A,
(f,P)  (g,P)⇔ min
p∈F(P)
p(i)Vˆi(f) ≥ min
p∈F(P)
p(i)Vˆi(g)
which is equivalent to
(f,P)  (g,P)⇔ min
p∈F(P)
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) ≥ min
p∈F(P)
p(i)Vˆi(g(i)).
Finally, that {Vˆi}i∈N are unique up to a common positive affine transformation follows from
Claim 7.
Claim 9. For all P,Q ∈ P, there exist unique compact and convex sets F(P),F(Q) ∈ P such
that, for all f, g ∈ A,
(f,P)  (g,Q)⇔ min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) ≥ min
p∈F(Q)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)),
where the Vˆi are affine representations of ˆi such that Vˆi(A) = Vˆj(A) for all i, j ∈ N . Moreover,
{Vˆi}i∈N are unique up to a common positive affine transformation.
Proof. Let f, g ∈ A and P,Q ∈ P. Let F(P) and F(Q) defined as in Claim 7. Assume that
(f,P)  (g,Q). By Axiom 6, there exist f¯ , f , g¯, g ∈ Acv such that:{
(f¯ ,P)  (f,P)  (f,P)
(g¯,Q)  (g,Q)  (g,Q).
Without loss of generality, assume that (f¯ , {δj})  (g¯, {δj}) and (f¯ , {δk})  (g¯, {δk}) for
some j, k ∈ N . Then, by Claim 4, (f¯ ,Q)  (g¯,Q) and (f,P)  (g,P). Therefore,{
(f¯ ,P)  (f,P)  (g,P)
(f¯ ,Q)  (g,Q)  (g,Q).
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Hence, by Axioms 1 and 3, there exist λ, µ ∈ [0, 1] such that (f,P) ∼ (λf¯ +(1−λ)g,P) and
(g,Q) ∼ (µf¯+(1−µ)g,Q). Hence (λf¯+(1−λ)g,P)  (µf¯+(1−µ)g,Q). Observe that by Claim
1, λf¯ +(1−λ)g ∈ Acv and µf¯ +(1−µ)g ∈ Acv. Therefore, by Axiom 8, (λf¯ +(1−λ)g, {δ1}) 
(µf¯ + (1− µ)g, {δ1}), and therefore, Vˆ1(λf¯(1) + (1− λ)g(1)) ≥ Vˆ1(µf¯(1) + (1− µ)g(1)).
Since (λf¯ + (1− λ)g,P) ∼ (f,P), we have by Claim 8:
min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) = min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(λf¯(i) + (1− λ)g(i))
= Vˆ1(λf¯(1) + (1− λ)g(1)).
Similarly,
min
p∈F(Q)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(g(i)) = min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(µf¯(i) + (1− µ)g(i))
= Vˆ1(µf¯(1) + (1− µ)g(1)).
Since Vˆ1(λf¯(1) + (1− λ)g(1)) ≥ Vˆ1(µf¯(1) + (1− µ)g(1)), we finally obtain:
min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) ≥ min
p∈F(Q)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(g(i)),
the desired result.
Hence, there exists a unique function F : P → PC , such that F(P) is compact and convex
for all set P ∈ P, such that for all f, g ∈ A, P,Q ∈ P,
(f,P)  (g,Q)⇔ min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) ≥ min
p∈F(Q)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)),
where the Vˆi are affine representations of ˆi such that Vˆi(A) = Vˆj(A), for all i, j ∈ N . Moreover,
{Vˆi}i∈N are unique up to a common positive affine transformation.
It remains to show that F(P) ⊆ co(P) for all P ∈ P, and that for all α ∈ (0, 1), all P,Q ∈ P,
F(αP + (1− α)Q) = αF(P) + (1− α)F(Q). This is done in the two following claims.
Claim 10. For all P ∈ P, F(P) ⊆ co(P).
Proof. Assume there exists P ∈ P such that F(P) * co(P). Then, there exists p∗ ∈ F(P) such
that p∗ /∈ co(P). Since F(P) and co(P) are convex sets, a separation argument implies that
there exists a function φ : N → R such that ∑i p∗(i)φ(i) < minp∈F(P)∑i p(i)φ(i). There exist
numbers a, b with a > 0 such that aφ(i)+ b ∈ Vˆi(A) for all i (choosing a sufficiently close to zero
will ensure that ajφj(i)+bj ∈ [−1, 1] for all i ∈ N). Hence, for all i, there exists yi ∈ Y such that
aφ(i) + b = Vˆi(yi). Define f by f(i) = yi for all i ∈ N . Note that minp∈co(P)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) ∈
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Vˆi(Acv), and therefore there exists h ∈ Acv such that Vˆi(h(i)) = minp∈co(P)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) for
all i ∈ N . We have, for all p ∈ P:∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) ≥ min
p∈co(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) = min
p∈co(P)
∑
i
p(i)(aφ(i) + b) = Vˆi(h(i))
Therefore, for all p ∈ P, (f, {p})  (h, {p}). But:
min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) ≤
∑
p∗(i)Vˆi(f(i))
=
∑
i
p∗(i)(aφ(i) + b) < min
p∈co(P)
∑
i
p(i)(aφi + b) = Vˆi(h(i))
= min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(h(i)).
Hence, (h,P)  (f,P), which is a violation of Axiom 5.
Claim 11. For all P,Q ∈ P, all α ∈ (0, 1), F(αP + (1− α)Q) = αF(P) + (1− α)F(Q).
Proof. Let P,Q ∈ P, and α ∈ (0, 1). For all f ∈ A, Let p∗(f) ∈ argminp∈F(P)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(f(i)),
and q∗(f) ∈ argminp∈F(Q)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) (since by Claim 9, F(P) and F(Q) are compact, p∗(f)
and q∗(f) are well-defined). By Claims 9 and 10, (f,P) ∼ (f, {p∗(f)}) and (f,Q) ∼ (f, {q∗(f)}).
By Axiom 4, this implies:
(f, αP + (1− α)Q) ∼ (f, α{p∗(f)}+ (1− α){q∗(f)}).
Hence, by Claims 9 and 10:
min
p∈F(αP+(1−α)Q)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) =
∑
i
(αp∗(f)(i) + (1− α)q∗(f)(i))Vˆi(f(i))
= α
∑
i
p∗(f)(i)Vˆi(f(i)) + (1− α)
∑
i
q∗(f)(i)Vˆi(f(i))
= α min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) + (1− α) min
p∈F(Q)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i))
= min
p∈αF(P)+(1−α)F(Q)
∑
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)).
Since this holds for all f ∈ F , unicity of F (see Claim 9) implies that F(αP + (1 − α)Q) =
αF(P) + (1− α)F(Q), the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 2
The necessity part of the Theorem is easily checked. We therefore only prove the sufficiency
part.
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We will use the following notations. For all subset T of N , let ∆(T ) be the simplex over T .
Let cT ∈ ∆(T ) be defined by cT (s) = 1|T | for all s ∈ T . Finally, let H : P×∆(N)× [0, 1]→ P be
defined by :
H(Q, c, θ) = {p ∈ ∆(N) |∃q ∈ Q s.t. p = θq + (1− θ)c} .
By Theorem 1, there exist affine functions Vˆi : Y → R, i ∈ N , representing ˆi and such that
Vˆi(A) = Vˆj(A), for all i, j ∈ N , and a function F : B→ B satisfying for all P,Q ∈ B,
1. F(P) ⊆ co(P)
2. For all α ∈ [0, 1], F(αP + (1− α)Q) = αF(P) + (1− α)F(Q)
such that for all P,Q ∈ B, and all f, g ∈ A, (f,P)  (g,Q) if, and only if:
min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f(i)) ≥ min
p∈F(Q)
∑
i
Vˆi(g(i)).
Furthermore, F is unique, and {Vˆi}i∈N are unique up to a common positive affine transformation.
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we will use the following slight abuse of notation: for all i ∈ N
and f ∈ A we define Vˆi(f) as Vˆi(f(i)).
The proof goes through several claims. Although not explicitly stated in the claims, all the
assumptions of Theorem 2 are made throughout this subsection.
Claim 12. For all P ∈ B, and all bijection ϕ : N → N , F(Pϕ) = (F(P))ϕ.
Proof. Let P ∈ B, and ϕ be a permutation on N . We will prove that F(P)ϕ ⊆ F(Pϕ). Assume
that such is not the case, i.e., there exists p∗ ∈ F(P)ϕ such that p∗ /∈ F(Pϕ). Since F(Pϕ)
and F(P)ϕ are convex sets, a standard separation argument implies that there exists a function
φ : N → R such that: ∑i p∗(i)φ(i) < minp∈F(Pϕ)∑i p(i)φ(i). There exist numbers a, b with
a > 0 such that aφ(i)+b ∈ Vˆi(A) for all i. Hence, for all i, there exists yi ∈ Y such that aφ(i)+b =
Vˆi(yi) (choosing a sufficiently close to zero will ensure that ajφj(i) + bj ∈ [−1, 1] for all i ∈ N).
Define f by f(i) = yi for all i ∈ N . We then have:
∑
i p
∗(i)Vˆi(f) < minp∈F(Pϕ)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(f).
Axiom 6 and Claim 1 in the proof of Theorem 1 imply that A(hψ) 6= ∅, for all permutation
ψ : N → N , and all h ∈ A. Let g ∈ A(fϕ−1). For all p ∈ F(P), ∑i p(i)Vˆi(g) =∑i pϕ(i)Vˆi(f).
Therefore, minp∈F(P)ϕ
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(f) = minp∈F(P)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(g). Therefore,
min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(g) = min
p∈F(P)ϕ
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f) ≤
∑
i
p∗(i)Vˆi(f) < min
p∈F(Pϕ)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f).
Therefore, (f,Pϕ)  (g,P), a contradiction with Axiom 11. The inclusion F(Pϕ) ⊆ F(P)ϕ can
be proved using a similar argument. Therefore, F(Pϕ) = F(P)ϕ.
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Claim 13. Let P ∈ B, I a subset of N , and fk ∈ A (k ∈ I). Then:
⋂
k∈I
(
argmin
p∈P
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
6= ∅ ⇒
⋂
k∈I
(
arg min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
6= ∅.
Proof. Let P ∈ B, I = {1, · · · ,m}, and fk ∈ A (k ∈ I) such that:
⋂
k∈I
(
argmin
p∈P
∑
i
Vˆi(fk)
)
6= ∅.
Assume for instance that (f1,P)  (fk,P), for all k ∈ I. By Axiom 6, there exists f¯ ∈ Acv such
that (f¯ ,P)  (f1,P). Hence, for all k ∈ I \ {1}, (f¯ ,P)  (f1,P)  (fk,P). Hence, by Axioms 1
and 3, for all k 6= 1, there exist αk ∈ [0, 1] such that (αkf¯+(1−αk)fk,P) ∼ (f1,P). But observe
that since f¯ ∈ Acv, argminp∈F(P)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(αkf¯ + (1 − αk)fk) = argminp∈F(P)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(fk).
Therefore, there is no loss in generality if we assume (f1,P) ∼ (fk,P), for all k ∈ I, an
assumption we maintain through this proof.
We now proceed by induction. Let
P(r) =
⋂
k∈I
(
argmin
p∈P
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
6= ∅ ⇒
⋂
k∈{1,··· ,r}
(
arg min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
6= ∅
 .
We first prove that P(2) is true. Assume that:(
arg min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f1)
)
∩
(
arg min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
Vˆi(f2)
)
= ∅.
Let p∗ ∈ argminp∈F(P)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(f1), and pˆ ∈ argminp∈F(P)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(f2). By assumption,∑
i
pˆ(i)Vˆi(f2) <
∑
i
p∗(i)Vˆi(f2),
and: ∑
i
p∗(i)Vˆi(f1) =
∑
i
pˆ(i)Vˆi(f2).
By Axiom 12, for all α ∈ (0, 1), (αf1 + (1− α)f2,P) ∼ (f1,P). Therefore:
min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(αf1 + (1− α)f2) = min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f1) =
∑
i
p∗(i)Vˆi(f1).
Therefore there exists p˜ ∈ F(P) such that:∑
i
p˜(i)Vˆi(αf1 + (1− α)f2) =
∑
i
p∗(i)Vˆi(f1),
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i.e.,
α
∑
i
p˜(i)Vˆi(f1) + (1− α)
∑
i
p˜(i)Vˆi(f2) =
∑
i
p∗(i)Vˆi(f1).
Therefore, since
∑
i p
∗(i)Vˆi(f1) =
∑
i pˆ(i)Vˆi(f2) :
α
∑
i
p˜(i)Vˆi(f1) + (1− α)
∑
i
p˜(i)Vˆi(f2) = α
∑
i
p∗(i)Vˆi(f1) + (1− α)
∑
i
pˆ(i)Vˆi(f2),
and therefore p˜ ∈
(
argminp∈F(P)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(f1)
)
∩
(
argminp∈F(P)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(f2)
)
, a contradic-
tion. Therefore, P(2) is true.
We now assume thatP(r−1) is true, with r−1 < m, and prove that thenP(r) is also true. As-
sume that
⋂
k∈{1,··· ,r}
(
argminp∈F(P)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
= ∅. By the induction assumption, there ex-
ists p∗ ∈ ⋂k∈{1,··· ,r−1} (argminp∈F(P)∑i p(i)Vˆi(fk)), and for all pˆ ∈ (argminp∈F(P)∑i p(i)Vˆi(fr)),∑
i
pˆ(i)Vˆi(fr) <
∑
i
pˆ(i)Vˆi(fr)
and ∑
i
pˆ(i)Vˆi(fr) =
∑
i
pˆ(i)Vˆi(fk), ∀k ∈ {1, · · · , r − 1}.
Let h =
∑r−1
k=1
1
r−1fk. We then have:
argmin
p∈P
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(h) = argmin
p∈P
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi
(
r−1∑
i=1
1
r − 1ki
)
= argmin
p∈P
∑
i
p(i)
(
r−1∑
i=1
Vˆi(fk)
)
,
the last equality being implied by the fact that the Vˆi are affine.
Let p1 ∈ argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(h), and assume that p1 /∈
⋂r−1
k=1
(
argminp∈P
∑
i Vˆi(fk)
)
.
Then, for all p2 ∈
⋂r−1
k=1
(
argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
, and all k ∈ {1, · · · , r−1},∑i p2(i)Vˆi(fk) ≤∑
i p1(i)Vˆi(fk), with a strict inequality for some j ∈ {1, · · · , r − 1}. But, then,
∑
i p2(i)Vˆi(h) <∑
i p1(i)Vˆi(h), a contradiction with the fact that p1 ∈ argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(h). Therefore,
argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(h) ⊆
⋂r−1
i=1
(
argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
. Conversely, let:
q1 ∈
r−1⋂
i=1
(
argmin
p∈P
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
.
Then, by definition, q1 ∈ argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(fk), for all k ∈ {1, · · · , r − 1}. Therefore, q1 ∈
argminP
∑
i p(i)
(∑r−1
k=1 Vˆi(fk)
)
= argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(h). Therefore,
r−1⋂
k=1
(
argmin
p∈P
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
⊆ argmin
p∈P
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(h),
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which implies
⋂r−1
k=1
(
argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
= argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(h).
Hence,
(
argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(h)
)
∩
(
argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(fr)
)
6= ∅. Furthermore, by as-
sumption, p∗ ∈ argminp∈F(P)
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(h) = argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)
(∑r−1
k=1
1
r−1 Vˆi(fk)
)
.
Therefore, Axiom 12 implies for all α ∈ [0, 1], (αh+ (1− α)fr,P) ∼ (h,P). Therefore,
min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(αh+ (1− α)fr) = min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(h) =
∑
i
p∗(i)Vˆi(h).
Hence, there exists p˜ ∈ F(P) such that:∑
i
p˜(i)Vˆi(αh+ (1− α)fr) =
∑
i
p∗(i)Vˆi(h),
i.e., since
∑
p∗(i)Vˆi(h) =
∑
i pˆ(i)Vˆi(fr):
α
∑
i
p˜(i)Vˆi(h) + (1− α)
∑
i
p˜(i)Vˆi(h) = α
∑
i
p∗(i)Vˆi(h) + (1− α)
∑
i
pˆ(i)Vˆi(fr),
which implies that p˜ ∈
(
argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(h)
)
∩
(
argminp∈P
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(fr)
)
. But:(
argmin
p∈P
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(h)
)
⊆
⋂
k∈{1,··· ,r−1}
(
arg min
p∈F(P)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
.
Therefore, p˜ ∈ ⋂l∈{1,··· ,r} (argminp∈F(P)∑i p(i)Vˆi(fk)), a contradiction.
Claim 14. Let S1, S2 ⊂ N such that S1 6= ∅, S2 6= ∅. Then, for all α ∈ [0, 1], there exists
θ ∈ [0, 1] such that F(α∆(S1)+(1−α)∆(S2)) = H(α∆(S1)+(1−α)∆(S2), αcS1+(1−α)cS2 , θ).
Proof. Let α ∈ [0, 1], and S1, S2 ⊂ N such that S1 6= ∅, S2 6= ∅. To simplify notation, let
c1 = cS1 and c2 = cS2 , ∆1 = ∆(S1), ∆2 = ∆(S2) and ∆ = α∆1 + (1− α)∆2. We first consider
the case |S1| > 1 and |S2| > 1.
We know by Theorem 1 that F(∆) = αF(∆1) + (1 − α)F(∆2). On the other hand, since
∆ϕi = ∆i, for all permutation ϕ : N → N such that ϕ(Si) = Si, Claim 12 implies that
F(∆i)ϕ = F(∆i) for all such permutations. Hence, ci ∈ F(∆i), and therefore, αc1+(1−α)c2 ∈
αF(∆1) + (1− α)F(∆2) = F(∆). Let c = αc1 + (1− α)c2
Since ∆ is a polytope, it has a finite number of facets and vertices. Let {F1, · · · , FK} be
the set of all facets of ∆, and Π = {pi∗1, · · · , pi∗M} be the set of its vertices. Furthermore, for all
m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, let Jm be a subset of {1, · · · ,K} such that ∩j∈JmFj = {pi∗m}.
For each facet Fj , let qj be in the (relative) interior of Fj . Let Ψj be the (unique) hyperplane
supporting ∆ at qj , defined by Ψj = {p |φj(p) = µj}, with µj ∈ R, and φj a linear function
(observe that Fj ⊂ Ψj). Since Ψj is a separating hyperplane for ∆, φj can be chosen such that
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φj(p) ≥ µj for all p ∈ ∆. Let φj(p) =
∑
i φj(i)p(i). There exist numbers aj and bj , with aj > 0
such that ajφj(i)+ bj ∈ Vˆi(A) for all i ∈ N (choosing a sufficiently close to zero will ensure that
ajφj(i)+bj ∈ [−1, 1] for all i ∈ N). Therefore, there exist yji ∈ Y such that ajφj(i)+bj = Vˆi(yji )
for all i ∈ N . Define fj by fj(i) = yji for all i ∈ N .
Observe that H(Ψj ∩ ∆, c, θ) are the sets for which
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(fj) is constant and smaller
than
∑
i c(i)Vˆi(fj). Furthermore, for all p ∈ H(Ψj ∩∆, c, θ), p′ ∈ H(Ψj , c, θ′), θ < θ′ if, and only
if,
∑
i p(i)Vˆi(fj) >
∑
i p
′(i)Vˆi(fj). Therefore, it is the case that, for some θˆj ,
arg min
p∈F(∆)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f) ⊆ H(Ψj ∩∆, c, θˆj).
Now, assume that there are two facets F` and Fj such that θˆ` 6= θˆj . Without loss of generality,
we can take F` and Fj such that F` ∩ Fj 6= ∅, and θˆ` > θˆj . Finally, consider pi ∈ F` ∩ Fj . There
exist numbers µ1, µ2, λ1, λ2 such that13 µ1φ`(i) + λ1 ∈ Vˆi(A) for all i ∈ N , µ2φj(i) + λ2 ∈ Vˆi(A)
for all i ∈ N , and { ∑
i pi(i)(µ1φ`(i) + λ1) =
∑
i pi(i)(µ2φj(i) + λ2)∑
i c(i)(µ1φ`(i) + λ1) =
∑
i c(i)(µ2φj(i) + λ2).
Therefore, there exit y˜ji and y˜
`
i in Y such that Vˆi(y˜
`
i ) = µ1φ`(i) + λ1 and Vˆi(y˜
j
i ) = µ2φj(i) + λ2
for all i ∈ N . Let g` be defined by g`(i) = y˜`i for all i, and gj be defined by gj(i) = y˜ji for all i.
Observe that:
argmin
p∈∆
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(gj) = argmin
p∈∆
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(fj)
and
argmin
p∈∆
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(g`) = argmin
p∈∆
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(f`).
Therefore,
argmin
p∈∆
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(gj) ∩ argmin
p∈∆
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(g`) 6= ∅.
Hence, by Axiom 12, (gj ,∆) ∼ (g`,∆), i.e.,
min
p∈F(∆)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(gj) = min
p∈F(∆)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(g`).
But we also have
min
p∈F(∆)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(gj) =
∑
i
qj(i)Vˆi(gj)
for any qj ∈ H(Ψj ∩∆, c, θˆj), and similarly,
min
p∈F(∆)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(g`) =
∑
i
q`(i)Vˆi(g`)
13Again, choosing these numbers sufficiently close to zero will ensure that µ1φ`(i)+λ1 and µ2φj(i)+λ2 belong
to [−1, 1].
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for any q` ∈ H(Ψ` ∩∆, c, θˆ`). So, in particular, we have
min
p∈F(∆)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(gj) =
∑
i
H(pi, c, θˆj)(i)Vˆi(gj)
and
min
p∈F(∆)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(g`) =
∑
i
H(pi, c, θˆ`)(i)Vˆi(g`).
Therefore, we must have:∑
i
H(pi, c, θˆj)(i)Vˆi(gj) =
∑
i
H(pi, c, θˆ`)(i)Vˆi(g`)∑
i
(θˆjpi(i) + (1− θˆj)c(i))Vˆi(gj) =
∑
i
(θˆ`pi(i) + (1− θˆ`)c(i))Vˆi(g`)
θˆj
∑
i
pi(i)Vˆi(gj) + (1− θˆj)
∑
i
c(i)Vˆi(gj) = θˆ`
∑
i
pi(i)Vˆi(g`) + (1− θˆ`)
∑
i
c(i)Vˆi(g`).
But
∑
i pi(i)Vˆi(gj) =
∑
i pi(i)Vˆi(g`),
∑
i c(i)Vˆi(gj) =
∑
i c(i)Vˆi(g`) and
∑
i pi(i)Vˆi(g`) <
∑
i c(i)Vˆi(g`),∑
i pi(i)Vˆi(gj) <
∑
i (¸i)Vˆi(gj). Therefore θˆ` > θˆj implies
θˆj
∑
i
pi(i)Vˆi(gj) + (1− θˆj)
∑
i
c(i)Vˆi(gj) > θˆ`
∑
i
pi(i)Vˆi(g`) + (1− θˆ`)
∑
i
c(i)Vˆi(g`),
a contradiction. Therefore, θˆj = θˆ`. Let θˆ = θˆk for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}. Observe that since
H(Ψj , c, θˆ) are supporting hyperplanes of F(∆) for all j ∈ {1, · · · ,K}, F(∆) ⊆ H(∆, c, θˆ).
Now, consider any vertex pi∗m of ∆. Because pi∗m ∈
⋂
k∈Jm Fk,⋂
k∈Jm
(
argmin
p∈∆
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
6= ∅.
Then, Claim 13 implies: ⋂
k∈Jm
(
arg min
p∈F(∆)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
6= ∅.
But: ⋂
k∈Jm
H(Fk, c, θˆ) = H(pi∗m, c, θˆ).
We thus have:
∅ 6=
⋂
k∈Jm
(
arg min
p∈F(∆)
∑
i
p(i)Vˆi(fk)
)
⊆
⋂
k∈Jm
H(Fk, c, θˆ) = H(pi∗m, c, θˆ).
Therefore, H(pi∗m, c, θˆ) ∈ F(∆). Now consider any other vertex pi∗r of ∆. Then there exists a
permutation ϕ : N → N (that depends of pi∗r ) satisfying ϕ(S1) = S1 and ϕ(S2) = S2, such that
pi∗r = (pi∗m)ϕ. Since ∆ = ∆ϕ for any such permutation, Claim 12 implies that:(
H(pi∗m, c, θˆ)
)ϕ
= H((pi∗m)ϕ, c, θˆ) = H(pi∗r , c, θˆ) ∈ F(∆).
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Thus, for any vertex pi∗ of ∆,H(pi∗, c, θˆ) ∈ F(∆). Since ∆ is polyhedral,H(∆) = co{H(pi∗m, c, θˆ)|pi∗m ∈
Π}. Therefore H(∆, c, θˆ) ⊆ F(∆). Since we proved that F(∆) ⊆ H(∆, c, θˆ), we finally obtain
H(∆, c, θˆ) = F(∆).
It remains to consider the case |Si| = 1 for some i ∈ {1, 2} (if |S1| = |S2| = 1, the result
follows trivially from Theorem 1). Assume without loss of generality, that |S1| = 1. Then
∆ = αδk + (1 − α)∆2, for some k ∈ N , where δk is the probability distribution on N defined
by δk(k) = 1. By Theorem 1, F(∆) = αδk + (1− α)F(∆2). But by the above result, F(∆2) =
H(∆2, c2, θˆ). Hence, F(∆) = αδk+(1−α)H(∆2, c2, θˆ) = H(αδk+(1−α)∆2, αδk+(1−α)c2, θˆ),
which proves the desired result.
Claim 15. There exists θ ∈ [0, 1] such that for all subset S of N , F(∆(S)) = H(∆(S), cS , θ).
Proof. Let S1 and S2 be two subsets of N . We use the same notation as in Claim 14. By Claim
14, we know that there exist θ1, θ2 ∈ [0, 1] such that F(∆i) = H(∆i, ci, θi). What remains to be
proved is that θ1 = θ2. Let α ∈ (0, 1), and ∆ = α∆1 + (1 − α)∆2. By Claim 14, we also know
that there exists θ3 ∈ [0, 1] such that:
F(∆) = H(∆, αc1 + (1− α)c2, θ3) = αH(∆1, c1, θ3) + (1− α)H(∆2, c2, θ3).
Finally, by Theorem 1,
F(∆) = αF(∆1) + (1− α)F(∆2)
Therefore,
αH(∆1, c1, θ1) + (1− α)H(∆2, c2, θ2) = αH(∆1, c1, θ3) + (1− α)H(∆2, c2, θ3)
which implies θ1 = θ2 = θ3, the desired result.
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